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Abstract. To protect data security and privacy in cloud storage systems,
a common solution is to outsource data in encrypted forms so that the
data will remain secure and private even if storage systems are compro-
mised. The encrypted data, however, must be pliable to search and access
control. In this paper, we introduce a notion of attribute-based encryp-
tion with expressive and authorized keyword search (ABE-EAKS) to sup-
port both expressive keyword search and ﬁne-grained access control over
encrypted data in the cloud. In ABE-EAKS, every data user is associated
with a set of attributes and is issued a private attribute-key correspond-
ing to his/her attribute set, and each data owner encrypts the message
using attribute-based encryption and attaches the encrypted message
with encrypted keywords related with the message, and then uploads the
encrypted message and keywords to the cloud. To access encrypted mes-
sages containing certain keywords satisfying a search policy, a data user
generates a trapdoor for the search policy using his/her private attribute-
key and sends it to the cloud server equipped to the cloud. The cloud
server searches over encrypted data stored in the cloud for the encrypted
messages containing keywords satisfying the search policy and sends back
the results to the data user who then decrypts the returned ciphertexts
to obtain the underlying messages. We present a generic construction for
ABE-EAKS, formally prove its security, give a concrete construction, and
then extend the concrete ABE-EAKS scheme to support user revocation.
Also, we implement the proposed ABE-EAKS scheme and its extension
and study their performance through experiments.
Keywords: Cloud storage · Data security and privacy · Keyword
search · Attribute-based encryption · Access control
1 Introduction
Consider a cloud storage system (e.g., [21,29,31]) that keeps personal health
records (PHRs) provided by various medical institutions (i.e., data owners),
in which all PHRs are stored in encrypted forms to protect data security and
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privacy [30]. In order to facilitate data sharing, it is important for a cloud storage
system to support powerful keyword search and scalable access control over
the encrypted PHRs [46]. A straightforward approach meeting this requirement
is to combine public key encryption mechanism and public-key based keyword
search1 such as public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) put forward
by Boneh et al. [8], which allows a cloud server (equipped to the cloud) to search
over encrypted PHRs on behalf of authorized data users (e.g., doctors, scientists)
without learning any information about the underlying PHRs. Informally, in this
combined approach, a PHR is encrypted using a public-key encryption scheme,
the keywords associated with the PHR are encrypted using PEKS, and the
ciphertext uploaded to the cloud is a concatenation of the “ciphertext” on the
PHR and the “PEKS ciphertext” on the keywords associated with the PHR. To
retrieve all encrypted PHRs containing certain keywords, a data user generates a
“trapdoor” corresponding to the keywords and sends it to the cloud server such
that the cloud server is able to spot and return all encrypted PHRs containing
the speciﬁed keywords but learns nothing about the underlying PHRs.
However, a traditional public-key encryption scheme is a one-to-one encryp-
tion scheme targeted for decryption by a single data user, while encrypted mes-
sages in the cloud storage scenarios are expected to be accessed by groups of data
users. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [28,37,43,44] is widely believed as a
promising solution for accomplishing ﬁne-grained access control over encrypted
data. In an ABE scheme, every data user is identiﬁed by a set of attributes and
issued a private attribute-key associated with his/her attributes, every message
is encrypted under an access structure, and any data user whose set of attribute
satisﬁes the access structure ascribed to a ciphertext can decrypt this ciphertext.
Ideally, search policies should be expressive such that it can be expressed
as conjunction, disjunction or any Boolean formulas. For example, in the afore-
mentioned cloud storage system for PHRs, to ﬁnd the relationship between “dia-
betes” and “age” or “weight”, a researcher may submit a keyword search request
with a search policy such as “(Illness: Diabetes AND (Age: 30 OR Weight: 100–
200))”2. Unfortunately, most of the existing PEKS schemes only support single
keyword search as in [8]. Though there are eﬀorts in designing expressive key-
word search (EKS) schemes that allows expressive keyword search policies (e.g.,
[10,13,24,32]), in all existing EKS schemes, data users need to send trapdoor
generation requests on search policies to a trusted third party such as the key
generation center (KGC), and then forward the trapdoors given by the KGC to
the cloud server to conduct search over encrypted data. Relying on the KGC to
generate trapdoors is not consistent with the standard PEKS notion in which
trapdoors are generated by each data user himself/herself, and makes the KGC a
bottleneck for both security and performance as it requires the KGC to be online
all the time to answer requests of data users. There are authorized keyword
1 In this paper, unless otherwise speciﬁed, all keyword search schemes we talk about
are in the public-key setting.
2 Note that in this paper, each keyword is divided into two parts Ni: Wi, where the
former is the keyword name and the latter is the keyword value, e.g., Illness, Age,
Weight are keyword names and Diabetes, 30, 100–200 are keyword values.
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search (AKS) schemes (e.g., [20,39–41]) which authorize data users the capa-
bilities of generating trapdoors by themselves, but existing solutions on AKS
either lack the expressiveness in search polices or is ineﬃcient due to the use
of bilinear pairings over the composite-order groups. We note that most of the
previous keyword search schemes are designed without taking message encryp-
tion into consideration, and yet it is known that simply combining a public-key
encryption scheme for the message encryption and a keyword search scheme for
the encryption of keywords may result in a solution subject to severe attacks [3].
Contributions. Motivated by the above observations, we propose a notion
of attribute-based encryption with expressive and authorized keyword search
(ABE-EAKS) to better meet the needs of cloud storage, which supports keyword
search and access control over encrypted data in the setting of multiple data own-
ers and multiple data users such as the cloud-based PHR system. Our goal is to
design an ABE-EAKS scheme which simultaneously enables ﬁne-grained access
control and expressive keyword search over encrypted data without depending
on a trusted third party to generate trapdoors. We compare our proposed ABE-
EAKS scheme with existing constructions on AKS in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of properties among the AKS schemes.
Expressiveness Authorized
keyword
search
Bilinear group Construction
AKS [39] AND, OR gates  Composite-Order Concrete
AKS [40] AND gates  Prime-Order Concrete
AKS [41] AND gates  Prime-Order Concrete
AKS [20] Single Keyword  Prime-Order Concrete
ABE-EAKS AND, OR gates  Composite-Order Generic
Prime-Order
We brieﬂy summarize our contributions in this paper as follows.
– Firstly, we propose the notion of ABE-EAKS, which allows ﬁne-grained access
control and expressive keyword search over encrypted messages without rely-
ing on a trusted third party for the trapdoor generation.
– Secondly, we give a generic construction of ABE-EAKS which can be applied
to transform ABE scheme and EKS scheme into a secure ABE-EAKS scheme,
and formally prove its security. The main potential security vulnerability of
an integrated ABE and EAKS scheme is the “swapping attack” [3] where an
attacker can tamper with the ciphertext (which could be either the part on
message encryption or the part on keyword encryption) stored in the cloud
without being detected so that a privileged data user will not obtain the
correct message. Thanks to the generic technique introduced by Fujisaki and
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Okamoto [15] to achieve security in the integrated public-key and symmetric
encryption schemes, we protect ABE-EAKS from swapping attacks by apply-
ing a similar approach as in [15] such that a data user can check whether a
ciphertext has been modiﬁed when performing decryption operation on the
ciphertext.
– Thirdly, we describe an instantiation of ABE-EAKS by applying concrete
ABE and EKS schemes into the generic transformation, and extend the
instantiation with an eﬃcient user revocation mechanism which simultane-
ously improves decryption eﬃciency.
– Fourthly, we implement the instantiation and its extension to assess their
performance.
1.1 Related Work
Attribute-Based Encryption. Sahai and Waters [37] ﬁrst introduced
attribute-based encryption (ABE). Later, Goyal et al. [17] formulated two com-
plimentary forms of ABE: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy
ABE (CP-ABE). In CP-ABE, a private attribute-key is associated with a set
of attributes and a ciphertext is associated with an access structure, while the
situation is reversed in KP-ABE. Nevertheless, we believe that KP-ABE is less
ﬂexible than CP-ABE because the access structure is determined once a data
user’s private attribute-key is issued3. Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [7] pro-
posed the ﬁrst CP-ABE scheme, but it was secure under the generic group model.
Cheung and Newport [11] presented a CP-ABE scheme secure under the stan-
dard model, but it only allowed the access structures in AND gates. A CP-ABE
scheme with expressive access structures was put forth by Goyal et al. [16] based
on the number theoretic assumption. Lewko et al. [25] put forward the ﬁrst fully
secure CP-ABE scheme, but it was in the composite-order groups. Rouselakis
and Waters [36] gave a large universe CP-ABE scheme in the prime-order groups
to improve the eﬃciency of ABE built from the composite-order groups while
overcoming the limitation of bounded attribute space, but it was selectively
secure.
Public-Key Encryption with Keyword Search. Since Boneh et al. [8] ini-
tiated the study of public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS), many
solutions [3,4,6,10,18,19,24,27,32,34,35,39,42,48–50] were proposed focusing
on addressing three limitations in PEKS: (1) how to make PEKS secure against
oﬄine keyword dictionary guessing attacks; (2) how to support expressive search
policies; and (3) how to achieve security in the integrated public-key encryption
(PKE) and keyword search in the public-key setting. For the security against
oﬄine keyword dictionary guessing attacks, it requires that no adversary (includ-
ing the cloud server) can learn keywords from a given trapdoor. To the best of
our knowledge, such a security notion is very hard to be achieved in the public-
key setting [38]. In terms of the expressive search policies, there are only a few
expressive keyword search (EKS) schemes [10,14,24,32,39], but they either are
3 In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise speciﬁed, what we talk about is CP-ABE.
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expensive in implementations (e.g., [10,24,32,39]) or have limitations in security
(e.g., [14]). Concerning the security of the integrated PKE scheme with keyword
search scheme, there are solutions such as [3,50], but they only consider the
security in the setting of the traditional public-key encryption schemes.
Authorized Keyword Search. Narayan, Gagne´ and Safavi-Naini [33] com-
bined PEKS and ABE to create a secure electronic health record system, which
provided both keyword search and access control mechanisms, but it failed to
address the privacy issue of access control policies. Li et al. [27] put forth a notion
of authorized private keyword search (APKS) in the setting of cloud storage and
presented two concrete constructions on APKS, but their schemes were lim-
ited in applications since the search policies were deﬁned and maintained by
the trusted authorities. Sun et al. [40,41] proposed an attribute-based keyword
search with ﬁne-grained owner-enforced search authorization scheme, but it only
supported access structures expressed in “AND” gates and search policies with
conjunctive keywords. Shi et al. [39] presented a searchable encryption based on
ABE to support ﬁne-grained search and access control, but their scheme required
each data user to ask a trusted trapdoor generation center to create trapdoors
on search policies on behalf of himself/herself. Jiang et al. [20] introduced the
notion of public-key encryption with authorized keyword search (PEAKS), but
their construction of PEAKS could only be applied to single keyword search.
1.2 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we revisit the
deﬁnitions to be used in this paper. In Sect. 3, after depicting the system archi-
tecture for ABE-EAKS, we present its security deﬁnition. In Sect. 4, we give
a generic construction of ABE-EAKS, and prove its security. We conclude this
paper in Sect. 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some basic cryptographic notions and deﬁnitions that
are to be used in this paper.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G be a group of a prime order p with a generator g. We deﬁne eˆ : G × G →
G1 to be a bilinear map if it has the following properties [9].
– Bilinear: for all g ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Zp, we have eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab.
– Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) = 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operation in G is eﬃciently
computable and there exists a group G1 and an eﬃciently computable bilinear
map eˆ : G × G → G1 as above.
ABE with EAKS 111
2.2 Access Structure and Linear Secret Sharing
Definition 1 Access Structures [26,45]. Let {P1, ..., Pn} be a set of parties.
A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then
C ⊆ A. An (monotone) access structure is a (monotone) collection A of non-
empty subsets of {P1, ..., Pn}, i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn}\{∅}. The sets in A are called
the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
Definition 2 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes [26,45]. Let P be a set of
parties, M be a matrix of size l×n, and ρ : {1, ..., l} → P be a function mapping
a row to a party for labeling. A secret sharing scheme Π over a set of parties P
is a linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) over Zp if
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There exists a matrix M which has l rows and n columns called the share-
generating matrix for Π. For i = 1, ..., l, the x-th row of matrix M is labeled
by a party ρ(i), where ρ : {1, ..., l} → P is a function that maps a row to
a party for labeling. Considering that the column vector v = (μ, r2, ..., rn),
where μ ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and r2, ..., rn ∈ Zp are randomly
chosen, then Mv is the vector of l shares of the secret μ according to Π. The
share (Mv)i belongs to a party ρ(i).
It has been noted in [26] that every LSSS also enjoys the linear reconstruc-
tion property. Suppose that Π is an LSSS for access structure A. Let A be an
authorized set, and deﬁne I ⊆ {1, ..., l} as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ A}. Then the vector
(1, 0, ..., 0) is in the span of rows of matrix M indexed by I, and there exist con-
stants {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, for any valid shares {vi} of a secret μ according
to Π,
∑
i∈I wivi = μ. These constants {wi} can be found in polynomial time
with respect to the size of the share-generating matrix M [5].
Boolean Formulas [26]. Access structures can also be described in terms of
monotonic boolean formulas. LSSS access structures are more general, and can be
derived from representations as boolean formulas. There are standard techniques
to convert any monotonic boolean formula into a corresponding LSSS matrix.
The boolean formula can be represented as an access tree, where the interior
nodes are AND and OR gates, and the leaf nodes correspond to attributes. The
number of rows in the corresponding LSSS matrix will be the same as the number
of leaf nodes in the access tree.
2.3 Attribute-Based Encryption
An attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme ABE [37] consists of a setup algo-
rithm ABE .Set(1λ) which outputs the public parameter par and the master
private key msk on input a security parameter λ, a key generation algorithm
ABE .KG(par, msk, A) which outputs a private attribute-key skA on input the
public parameter par, the master private key msk and an attribute set A, an
encryption algorithm ABE .Enc(par, A m) which outputs a ciphertext CT on
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input the public parameter par, an access structure A and a message m, and a
decryption algorithm ABE .Dec(par, skA, CT) which outputs a message m or a
failure symbol ⊥ on input the public parameter par, a private key skA and a
ciphertext CT.
An ABE scheme ABE is indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks
(IND-CPA secure) if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A
= (A1, A2), the advantage function
AdvIND-CPAABE,A (λ) = Pr
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣b
′ = b
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(par,msk) ← ABE .Set(1λ); b ← {0, 1}
(m0,m1,A∗, st) ← AABE.KG(msk,·)1 (par)
CT∗ ← ABE .Enc(par,A∗,mb)
b′ ← AABE.KG(msk,·)2 (par,m0,m1,A∗, st,CT∗)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
− 1/2
is negligible in the security parameter λ, where |m0| = |m1|, st is the state
information, and adversary A is not allowed to make key generation queries on
attributes that can satisfy the challenge access structure A∗.
2.4 Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption (SE) scheme SE with a key space K is composed of an
encryption algorithm SE .Enc(K, m) which outputs a ciphertext CT on input
a key K and a message m, and a decryption algorithm SE .Dec(K, CT) which
outputs m or a failure symbol ⊥ on input a key K and a ciphertext CT [15].
Let st be the state information. A symmetric encryption scheme SE is secure
under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA secure), if for any PPT adversary A
= (A1, A2), the advantage function
AdvIND-CPASE,A (λ) = Pr
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣b
′ = b
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
K ← K; b ← {0, 1}
(m0,m1, st) ← A1(1λ)
CT∗ ← SE .Enc(K,mb)
b′ ← A2(par,m0,m1, st,CT∗)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ − 1/2
is negligible in the security parameter λ, where |m0| = |m1|.
2.5 Expressive Keyword Search
An expressive keyword search (EKS) scheme EKS [24] consists of a setup algo-
rithm EKS.Set(1λ) which outputs the public parameter par and the master
private key msk on input a security parameter λ, a trapdoor generation algo-
rithm EKS.Trd(par, msk, S) which outputs a trapdoor TS on input the public
parameter par, the master private key msk and a search policy S, an encryption
algorithm EKS.Enc(par, W) which outputs a ciphertext CT on input the public
parameter par and a set of keywords W, and a test algorithm EKS.Tst(par, TS,
CT) which outputs 1 or 0 on input the public parameter par, a trapdoor TS and
a ciphertext CT.
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Denote by st the state information. An expressive keyword search scheme
EKS is indistinguishable under chosen keyword-set attacks (IND-CKA secure)
if for any PPT adversary A = (A1, A2), the advantage function
AdvIND-CKAEKS,A (λ) = Pr
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣b
′ = b
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(par,msk) ← EKS.Set(1λ); b ← {0, 1}
(W∗0,W
∗
1, st) ← AEKS.Trd(msk,·)1 (par)
CT∗ ← EKS.Enc(par,W∗b)
b′ ← AEKS.Trd(msk,·)2 (par,W∗0,W∗1, st,CT∗)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
− 1/2
is negligible in the security parameter λ, where |W∗0| = |W∗1|, and adversary
A is not allowed to make trapdoor generation queries on keywords that can be
satisﬁed by the challenge keyword set W∗0 or W
∗
1.
3 System Architecture and Security Model
In this section, we describe the framework and security deﬁnition of attribute-
based encryption with expressive and authorized keyword search (ABE-EAKS).
3.1 System Architecture
The architecture of an ABE-EAKS scheme is shown in Fig. 1, which consists
of data owners who outsource encrypted data and the associated keywords to
the cloud, data users who are identiﬁed by diﬀerent attributes and are privi-
leged to access data in the cloud, a key generation center (KGC) who holds the
master private key and publishes the public parameter and is responsible for
generating private attribute-keys for data users in terms of their attributes, and
a cloud for data storage which is equipped with a cloud server who executes
search operations over encrypted data for data users. Suppose that a data owner
Bob uploads to the cloud an encrypted document M along with m encrypted
keywords N1: W1, ..., Nm: Wm (here Ni is the keyword name and Wi is the
keyword value) using the public parameter, and an authorized data user Alice,
who is issued with a private attribute-key generated by the KGC in terms of
her attributes, wants to search for documents containing keywords that satisfy
a search policy S. In order to do so, Alice generates a trapdoor over the search
policy S using her private attribute-key. Then, Alice forwards this trapdoor to
the cloud server such that the cloud server is able to spot all ciphertexts that
contain the keywords which satisfy the search policy S and can be decrypted by
Alice. Finally, the cloud server sends the relevant ciphertexts back to Alice.
We assume that the KGC is a trusted entity. The cloud is pubic, and thus any
ciphertexts stored in the cloud might be tampered with by any malicious party.
The cloud server is assumed to be “honest-but-curious”, i.e., it honestly follows
the protocol but it is curious to learn the data stored in the cloud. Data owners
are assumed to honestly encrypt their data as well as the associated keywords and
upload the corresponding ciphertext to the cloud. Data users are not trusted, and
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Cloud
Server
Cloud
Data 
Owner W1, …, Wm
Data 
User
Document 1 Keyword set W1
…… ……
Document n Keyword set Wn
Ciphertexts of
encrypted documents
and their keywords
Illness: Diabetes
Gender: Male
Affiliation: City Hospital
Attributes
Department: Medicine
Key
Generaon
Center (KGC)
Weight
OR
Gender
Illness
AND
Search policy 
with hidden 
Keyword values
Age
AND
Cloud
Fig. 1. System architecture of ABE-EAKS.
they may even collude with other participants in order to discover information
beyond their privileges. We assume that the trusted KGC is equipped with a
separate authentication mechanism to verify data users before issuing private
attribute-keys to them.
3.2 Framework
Formally, an ABE-EAKS scheme consists of the following algorithms: setup
algorithm Setup, user key generation algorithm KeyGen, trapdoor generation
algorithm Trapdoor, encryption algorithm Encrypt, testing algorithm Test and
decryption algorithm Decrypt. In an ABE-EAKS scheme, the KGC is given the
public parameter and master private key generated from the Setup algorithm,
and runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate each data user a private attribute-
key in terms of his/her attributes. A data owner runs the Encrypt algorithm on
the document and the relevant keywords using the public parameter, and uploads
the corresponding ciphertext to the cloud. A data user can create a trapdoor on
a search policy over a set of keywords by running the Trapdoor algorithm using
his/her private attribute-key. Given a trapdoor, the cloud server runs the Test
algorithm to determine whether an encrypted document contains the keywords
satisfying the speciﬁed search policy and its access structure can be satisﬁed by
the attributes associated with the trapdoor. After receiving the results from the
cloud server, the data user runs the Decrypt algorithm on the ciphertexts to
obtain the underlying document.
– Setup(1λ) → (par, msk). Taking the security parameter λ as the input, this
algorithm outputs the public parameter par and the master private key msk.
– KeyGen(par, msk, A) → skA. Taking the public parameter par, the master
private key msk and an attribute set A of a data user as the input, this
algorithm outputs a private attribute-key skA for this data user.
– Trapdoor(par, skA, S) → TA,S. Taking the public parameter par, the private
attribute-key skA of a data user and a search policy S over a set of keywords
as the input, this algorithm outputs a trapdoor TA,S.
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– Encrypt(par, (M , A), W) → CT. Taking the public parameter par, a message
M and an access structure A, and a set of keywords W as the input, this
algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT which consists of CTM (an encryption of
M under A), CTW (an encryption of W) and τ (a tag binding CTM and
CTW to prevent them from being tampered with).
– Test(par, CT, TA,S) → 1/0. Taking the public parameter par, a ciphertext
CT and a trapdoor TA,S as the input, this algorithm outputs either 1 if
the keywords associated with CT satisﬁes the search policy of TA,S and the
access structure ascribed to CT can be satisﬁed by the attributes of TA,S or
0 otherwise, i.e., the Test algorithm outputs 1 if (1) the attributes associated
with the trapdoor satisfy the access structure of the ciphertext; and (2) the
ciphertext contains the keywords satisfying the search policy of the trapdoor.
– Decrypt(par, skA, CT) → M/⊥. Taking the public parameter par, a private
attribute-key skA over an attribute set A and a ciphertext CT as the input.
This algorithm parses CT = (CTM , CTW, τ), and checks whether the tag τ is
valid for CTM and CTW. If so, it decrypts CTM and outputs the plaintext M
when the attributes of skA satisﬁes the access structure of CTM . Otherwise,
it outputs a failure symbol ⊥.
We require that an ABE-EAKS scheme is correct, meaning that for all key-
word sets W satisfying search policies S, and attribute sets A satisfying access
structures A, if (par, msk) ← Setup(1λ), skA ← KeyGen(par, msk, A), TA,S
← Trapdoor(par, skA, S), CT ← Encrypt(par, (M , A), W), then Test(par, CT,
TA,S) = 1, Decrypt(par, skA, CT) = M .
Notice that in the concrete construction, the input A in the Encrypt algo-
rithm will be set to be (MA, ρA) where MA is a matrix, and ρA is a function
maps the rows of MA to attributes. In addition, the input S in the Trapdoor
algorithm will be set to be (MS, ρS, {ρS(i)}), where MS is a matrix, and ρS is a
function that associates the rows of MS to keyword names, and {ρS(i)} are the
corresponding keyword values.
3.3 Security Definitions
In addition to provide the conﬁdentiality of the encrypted data (i.e., data pri-
vacy), an ABE-EAKS scheme should ensure that any private information about
the keywords will not be revealed from the ciphertext (i.e., keyword privacy).
Also, it should guarantee that a ciphertext that encrypts a message and a set of
keywords cannot be tampered with without being detected. Below we describe
the security game called indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks
(i.e., IND-CCA security) for ABE-EAKS to meet these requirements, which is
deﬁned between a challenger algorithm C and an adversary algorithm A.
– Setup. Algorithm C runs the Setup algorithm to obtain the public parameter
par and the master private key msk, and gives par to algorithm A.
– Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues the following queries.
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1. Algorithm A issues queries for the private attribute-keys corresponding
to the attribute sets A1, ..., Aq1 . For each Ai, i ∈ [1, q1], algorithm C
runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate and send skAi to algorithm A.
2. Algorithm A issues queries for the plaintexts of the ciphertexts CT1, ...,
CTq2 . For each CTi, i ∈ [1, q2], algorithm C runs the Decrypt algorithm
to output and send Mi to algorithm A.
– Challenge. We describe this phase in terms of data privacy and keyword
privacy, respectively.
• Data privacy. Algorithm A outputs two messages M∗0 , M∗1 of the same
size, an access structure A∗ and a keyword set W∗. Algorithm C randomly
chooses β ∈ {0, 1}, runs the Encrypt algorithm on (M∗β , A∗), W∗ to
obtain and send the challenge ciphertext CT∗ to algorithm A.
• Keyword privacy. Algorithm A outputs a message M∗, an access structure
A
∗ and two keyword sets W∗0, W
∗
1 of the same size. Algorithm C randomly
chooses β ∈ {0, 1}, runs the Encrypt algorithm on (M∗, A∗), W∗β to
obtain and send the challenge ciphertext CT∗ to algorithm A.
– Phase 2. Algorithm A continues issuing queries to algorithm C as in Phase 1
except with the following restrictions.
1. Algorithm A issues queries for the private attribute-keys corresponding
to the attribute sets Aq1+1, ..., Aq with the restriction that any Ai for
i ∈ [q1 + 1, q] cannot satisfy A∗.
2. Algorithm A issues queries for the plaintexts of the ciphertexts CTq2+1,
..., CTq′ with the restriction that any CTi for i ∈ [q2 + 1, q′] is not equal
to CT∗.
– Guess. Algorithm A outputs its guess β′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if β′ = β.
An ABE-EAKS scheme is IND-CCA secure if the advantage function refer-
ring to the security game GameINDΠ,A
AdvINDΠ,A(λ)
def= |Pr[β = β′] − 1/2|
is negligible in the security parameter λ for any probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) adversary algorithm A.
In addition, an ABE-EAKS scheme is said to be selectively IND-CCA secure
if an Init stage is added before the Setup phase where algorithm A commits to
the challenge access structure A∗ and keyword set W∗ (or keyword sets W∗0,
W∗1) which it aims to attack.
4 Generic Construction and Its Extensions
In this section, we give a generic construction of attribute-based encryption
with expressive and authorized keyword search (ABE-EAKS), and analyze its
security.
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4.1 Generic Construction
Denote by M the message space, K the key space, R the randomness space.
Let ABE = (ABE .Setup, ABE .KeyGen, ABE .Encrypt, ABE .Decrypt) be an
attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme (e.g., [36,37]), EKS = (EKS.Setup,
EKS.Trapdoor, EKS.Encrypt, EKS.Test) be an expressive keyword search
(EKS) scheme (e.g., [14,24]), and SE = (SE .Encrypt, SE .Decrypt) be a sym-
metric encryption (SE) scheme. Below we describe the generic construction on
ABE-EAKS.
– Setup. This algorithm takes the security parameter λ as the input. It runs
the ABE .Setup algorithm to obtain the public parameter parABE and the
master private key mskABE . Then, it runs the EKS.Setup algorithm to obtain
the public parameter parEKS and the master private key mskEKS . Also, it
randomly chooses two hash functions H0 : M → K, H1 : M → R. It outputs
the public parameter par = (parABE , parEKS , H0, H1) and the master private
key msk = (mskABE , mskEKS).
Remarks. For the correctness of the proposed generic construction on ABE-
EAKS, we require that the schemes EKS and ABE share most elements in
their public parameters such that mskABE ⊆ mskEKS (or mskEKS ⊆ mskABE)
holds. Note that this is possible since there exist techniques to convert a CP-
ABE scheme to a KP-ABE scheme, and vice versa [2], and an EKS scheme
can be obtained from a KP-ABE scheme [14,23]. Therefore, ctW and ct1 (to
be deﬁned below) generated using the same randomness have several elements
in common.
– KeyGen. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, the master pri-
vate key msk and a data user’s attribute set A as the input. It runs the
ABE .KeyGen algorithm on the attribute set A and outputs skA as the pri-
vate attribute-key.
– Trapdoor. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, a private attribute-
key skA and a search policy S as the input. It runs the EKS.Trapdoor algo-
rithm on the search policy S by using the private attribute-key skA in place
of the master private key mskEKS to generate the trapdoor TA,S = (TA, TS),
where TA is associated with attributes of the data user, and TS is associated
with the search policy.
Remarks.Notice that there exists a twist here for running the EKS.Trapdoor
algorithm using the private attribute-key skA in place of the required mas-
ter private key. Firstly, the Trapdoor algorithm randomly chooses a value s,
and binds the value s to skA to obtain TA by performing certain operations.
Then it runs the EKS.Trapdoor algorithm on the search policy S using the
secret value s in place of the required master private key mskEKS to obtain
TS. Finally, it outputs the trapdoor TA,S = (TA, TS).
– Encrypt. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, a message M , an
access structure A and a keyword set W as the input. Firstly, it randomly
chooses R ∈ M, and runs the ABE .Encrypt algorithm on the “message” R
and the access structure A to generate CTR. Secondly, it computes CTM by
running the SE .Encrypt algorithm on the message M using the key H0(R).
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Thirdly, it computes r = H1(M,R), and runs the EKS.Encrypt algorithm
on the keyword set W using the randomness r to generate ctW. Fourthly, it
runs the ABE .Encrypt algorithm on an identity element 1 under the access
structure A using the randomness r to generate ct1. Finally, it outputs the
ciphertext CT = (CTR, CTM , CTW) for CTW = (ctW, ct1), where (CTR,
CTM ) is the encryption of the message M , CTW is the encryption of the
keywords W, which also implicitly plays the role of the tag τ .
– Test. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, a trapdoor TA,S and a
ciphertext CT as the input. It parses TA,S as (TA, TS), and CT as (CTR, CTM ,
(ctW, ct1)). Firstly, it runs the ABE .Decrypt algorithm on the ciphertext ct1
using TA as the private attribute-key to obtain an intermediate value X0.
Then, it runs the EKS.Test algorithm on the trapdoor TS and the ciphertext
(X0, ctW). If the keywords and access structure ascribed to CTW satisfy the
search policy and attributes associated with TA,S, it outputs 1. Otherwise, it
outputs 0.
Remarks. Since the attributes associated with the private attribute-key of
each data user are embedded in the trapdoor, the Test algorithm also excludes
those ciphertexts whose access structures cannot be satisﬁed by the attributes
of the data user.
– Decrypt. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, a private attribute-
key skA and a ciphertext CT as the input. It parses CT as (CTR, CTM ,
CTW). It runs the ABE .Decrypt algorithm on the ciphertext CTR using the
private attribute-key skA to obtains R′. Then, it computes M ′ by running the
SE .Decrypt algorithm on the ciphertext CTM using the key H0(R′). Finally,
it computes r′ = H1(M ′, R′), and runs the Encrypt algorithm on using the
randomness r′ to obtain CT′W. If CT
′
W is equal to CTW, it outputs M .
Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
4.2 Security Proof
Theorem 1. Assuming that the underlying ABE is IND-CPA secure, SE is
IND-CPA secure, and EKS is IND-CKA secure, then the proposed construction
on ABE-EAKS is IND-CCA secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assuming that there exists an adversary algorithm A that breaks the
IND-CCA security of the proposed ABE-EAKS scheme, then we can build an
adversary algorithm A′ that breaks the IND-CPA security of the underlying
schemes ABE , SE or EKS. Denote by B0, B1, B2 the challenger algorithms in
the IND-CPA security games of the schemes ABE , SE , EKS, respectively.
– Setup. Algorithm A′ is given parABE from algorithm B0 of ABE , and parEKS
from the algorithm B1 of EKS. Algorithm A′ sends par = (parABE , parEKS ,
H0, H1) to algorithm A, where H0, H1 are random oracles controlled by
algorithm A′.
– H0, H1-queries. At any time, algorithm A can query the random oracle H0
(or H1). To respond to these queries, algorithm A′ keeps an initially empty
list LH0 (or LH1) of tuples (Ri, ki) (or ((Mi, Ri), ri)).
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• If the query Ri (or (Mi, Ri)) already exists in the list LH0 (or LH1),
algorithm A′ responds with ki = H0(Ri) (or ri = H1(Mi, Ri)).
• Otherwise, it randomly chooses ki (or ri), sets ki = H0(Ri) (or ri =
H1(Mi, Ri)), and stores ki (or ri) to the list LH0 (or LH1).
– Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issue the following queries to algorithm A′.
• Algorithm A issues private attribute-key queries on attribute sets Ai.
Algorithm A′ forwards each private attribute-key query on Ai to algo-
rithm B0, and sends the corresponding private attribute-key obtained
from algorithm B0 to algorithm A.
• Algorithm A issues decryption queries on ciphertexts CTi. If algorithm
A′ does not have the private attribute-key to decrypt the ciphertext, it
issues a private attribute-key query on an attribute set satisfying the
access structure of CTi to algorithm B0, and then uses the returned pri-
vate attribute-key to decrypt CTi and sends the result to algorithm A.
Otherwise, algorithm A′ runs the ABE .Decrypt algorithm on CTi and
sends the result to algorithm A.
– Challenge. We discuss this phase in terms of data privacy and key privacy,
respectively.
• Data privacy. Algorithm A outputs two messages M∗0 , M∗1 of the same
size, an access structure A∗ and a keyword set W∗. Algorithm A′ sends
R∗0, R
∗
1 and A
∗ to algorithm B0 to obtain CTR∗β , and M∗0 , M∗1 to algorithm
B1 to obtain CTM∗β . Also, it randomly chooses k ∈ K, r ∈ R, β ∈ {0, 1},
sets k = H0(R∗β), r = H1(M
∗
β , R
∗
β) (note that because of random oracle,
adversary A′ can easily perform this setting), and runs the EKS.Encrypt
algorithm on W∗ to obtain CTW∗ using the randomness r. Algorithm
A′ sends the challenge ciphertext CT∗ = (CTR∗β , CTM∗β , CT∗W) to
algorithm A.
• Keyword privacy. Algorithm A outputs a message M∗, an access structure
A
∗ and two keyword sets W∗0, W
∗
1 of the same size. Algorithm A′ sends
W∗0, W
∗
1 to algorithm B2 to obtain CTW∗β . Also, it randomly chooses
R∗ ∈ M, r ∈ R, sets r = H1(M∗, R∗) (assuming that r is the randomness
used in generating CTW∗β ), and runs the ABE .Encrypt algorithm on R∗
and A∗ to obtain CTR∗ , the SE .Encrypt algorithm on M∗ using the key
H0(R∗) to obtain CTM∗ . Algorithm A′ sends the challenge ciphertext
CT∗ = (CTR∗ , CTM∗ , CT∗Wβ ) to algorithm A.
– Phase 2. Algorithm A continues issuing queries to algorithm A′ as in Phase
1, following the restrictions deﬁned in the security model.
– Guess. Algorithm A makes a guess β′ for β, algorithm A′ forwards β′ to
algorithm B0, B1, B2 as the guesses to the IND-CPA security games for the
schemes ABE , SE and KS.
In the view of algorithm A, the simulation is the same as the real security
game except that algorithm A issues R∗β for β ∈ {0, 1} or R∗ (or (M∗β , R∗β)
for β ∈ {0, 1} or (M∗, R∗)) to the random oracle H0 (or H1). Notice that
algorithm A has negligible probability in outputting such queries; otherwise,
it helps algorithm A′ directly break the IND-CPA security of the underlying
120 H. Cui et al.
attribute-based encryption scheme ABE , symmetric encryption scheme SE or
expressive keyword search scheme EKS.
To conclude, if algorithm A can win the IND-CCA game of ABE-EAKS,
then algorithm A′ can win the IND-CPA game of the underlying schemes ABE ,
SE or EKS. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
4.3 Extensions
The proposed generic construction on ABE-EAKS can be extended as follows.
– Standard model. Due to the eﬃciency purpose, the proposed ABE-EAKS
scheme is secure in the random oracle model. There exist generic methodolo-
gies (e.g., [22]) to achieve security in the standard model, which can be applied
to build a generic construction on ABE-EAKS that is secure in the standard
model. Thus, we can replace the symmetric encryption scheme and random
oracles in the proposed ABE-EAKS scheme by the tag-based encryption as
introduced in [22], thereby resulting in a generic construction on ABE-EAKS
that is secure in the standard model.
– User revocation. As a cloud storage system may involve a large number of
data users whose access rights may change with time, it is important to
equip it with an eﬃcient user revocation mechanism. Taking eﬃciency into
consideration, techniques utilizing a third party to achieve user revocation
(e.g., [12,47]) might be desirable solutions, which can simultaneously reduce
data users’ computational overheads in decryption. It is possible to incorpo-
rate such techniques into ABE-EAKS to additionally achieve eﬃcient user
revocation in the cloud storage system. We detail how to accomplish it in
full version4 of this paper using a concrete construction as an example.
4.4 Performance Analysis
Let lS be the number of keywords in a search policy, lM be the number of
attributes in an access structure, k be the size of an attribute set associated
with a private attribute-key, and m be the size of a keyword set ascribed to
a ciphertext. In Table 2, we summarize the computational overheads incurred
in the instantiation of ABE-EAKS (given in the full version) and its extension
supporting user revocation. Denote “NA” as not applicable, “E” as an expo-
nentiation operation, “P” as a pairing operation, IS = {I1, ..., Iχ1} as a set of
minimum keyword subsets satisfying a search policy S, χ2 as |I1| + ... + |Iχ1 |.
We implement the instantiation of ABE-EAKS and its extension in Charm
[1]. We use Charm of version Charm-0.43 and Python 3.4 in our implementa-
tion. Along with Charm-0.43, we install the PBC library for the underlying
cryptographic operations. Our experiments are run on a laptop with Intel Core
i5-4210U CPU @ 1.70GHz and 8.00GB RAM running 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04. We
conduct the experiments over the elliptic curves: SS512 and MNT159 to provide
4 Please contact the authors for the full version.
ABE with EAKS 121
Table 2. Computational overhead of the instantiation and its extension.
Trapdoor Encrypt Test (per
search)
Transform
server
Decrypt user
Instantiation
on ABE-EAKS
(4k + 3) ·
E + 13lS · E
(4 + 10lM) ·
E + 7m · E
≤ (k + χ2) ·
E + (3k +
1 + 6χ2) · P
NA ≥ 4 · P + 2 · E
Extension (4k + 3) ·
E + 13lS · E
(4 + 10lM) ·
E + 7m · E
≤ (k + χ2) ·
E + (3k +
1 + 6χ2) · P
≥ 4 · P + E 2 · E
security level of 80-bit, where SS512 is a supersingular elliptic curve with the
symmetric Type 1 pairing on it, and MNT159 is an asymmetric Type 3 pairing.
To begin with, we test the performance of the search function in the instan-
tiation. In the experiments, each keyword contains a keyword name such as
“Illness”, “Position” and a keyword value such as “Diabetes”, “Doctor”, and we
generate a random set of keywords containing 10 to 50 keywords, and use them
to create 5,000 ciphertexts with access structures composed of 10 attributes.
Thereafter, we create a set of search policies containing 2 to 10 keywords, and
use them to yield trapdoors under the assumption that the data user is given
a private attribute-key associated with 20 attributes. Finally, we run the test
algorithm on the ciphertexts and the trapdoors.
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Fig. 2. Computation time of the Trapdoor, Encrypt and Test algorithms.
Figure 2 shows the average computation time of running the Trapdoor,
Encrypt and Test algorithms, respectively. In terms of the trapdoor generation
(See Fig. 2-(a)), the computation time of a data user in creating a trapdoor over a
search policy of 2 to 10 keywords ranges from 0.2 s and 0.4 s for the SS512 curve,
and 0.1 s to 0.3 s for the MNT159 curve, respectively. For the data encryption
(See Fig. 2-(b)), the computation time of generating a ciphertext having 10 to
50 keywords and an access structure with 10 attributes is 0.3 s to 0.8 s for the
SS512 curve, and 0.4 s to 1.2 s for the MNT159 curve, respectively. The compu-
tation time of the Test algorithm increases as the number of keywords involved
in the trapdoor and the ciphertext raises (See Fig. 2-(c)). Regarding the 2 curves
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used in our experiments, given a trapdoor for a search policy composed of 10
keywords, the computation time of searching over 5,000 encrypted documents
each having 50 keywords is about 82 s and 233 s, respectively.
In addition, we test the computation time of a data user with 10 to 50
attributes in decrypting a ciphertext with an access structure composed of 2 to 10
attributes in the instantiation on ABE-EAKS and its extension in Fig. 3. In the
instantiation of ABE-EAKS (See Fig. 3-(a)), the computation time of decrypting
ciphertexts for access structures with 2 to 10 attributes using attribute-keys of
10 to 50 attributes ranges from 6.5ms to 17ms for the SS512 curve and 19ms to
34ms for the MNT159 curve, respectively, while in the extension (See Fig. 3-(b)),
the computation time of decrypting ciphertexts for access structures with 2 to
10 attributes using attribute-keys of 10 to 50 attributes is about 0.6ms in terms
of the SS512 curve and 1.6ms in terms of the MNT159 curve, respectively.
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Fig. 3. Computation time of decrypting a ciphertext by a data user.
5 Conclusions
Data encryption is an eﬀective way for protecting data security and privacy in the
cloud; however, in order for encrypted data to be useful, encryption mechanisms
must be amenable to search and access control. In this paper, we introduced
a notion of attribute-based encryption with expressive and authorized keyword
search (ABE-EAKS) to support both expressive keyword search and ﬁne-grained
access control over encrypted data in cloud-based storage systems. We ﬁrst pre-
sented the framework of ABE-EAKS and gave its security deﬁnition, and then
provided a generic construction on ABE-EAKS which is able to transform any
IND-CPA secure ABE scheme and IND-CKA secure EKS scheme into an IND-
CCA secure ABE-EAKS scheme. Thereafter, we gave a concrete construction
of ABE-EAKS based on the transformation and extended it to support user
revocation. Finally, we implemented the concrete ABE-EAKS scheme and its
extension, and studied their performance through experiments.
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